Marquette Law Review
Volume 59
Issue 4 1976 (Number 4)

Article 6

A Survey of the Governmental Regulation of
Nuclear Power Generation
Mark S. Young

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Mark S. Young, A Survey of the Governmental Regulation of Nuclear Power Generation, 59 Marq. L. Rev. 835 (1976).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol59/iss4/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

A SURVEY OF THE GOVERNMENTAL
REGULATION OF NUCLEAR POWER
GENERATION
Of the innumerable activities regulated by the federal government, none has inspired more extensive or elaborate governmental control than nuclear technology. Although initially
motivated by a concern over the military uses of nuclear energy, the federal government regulatory structure today is more
involved with the domestic environmental ramifications of the
nuclear generation of electric power.
This great interest in surveilling and regulating nuclear energy is not unwarranted. It is difficult to conceive of a catastrophe which could compare to the consequences of a major
escape of nuclear debris in a densely populated area. This article will examine the regulation of nuclear power generation and
its relation to environmental law.
I.

INTRODUCTION

At the present time nuclear generation provides approximately six percent of the electrical capacity of the United
States, but it is expected that by the year 2000 fifty percent of
the national electric power capacity will be produced by nuclear reactors.' Presently there are fifty-six operable nuclear
reactors, sixty-three are under construction, 2 and projections
indicate that by the turn of the century between five hundred
to one thousand nuclear reactors will be operating commercially in the United States.3
Studies have demonstrated that domestic oil and gas supplies may provide only ten years of our energy needs at the
current prices, and domestic coal resources represent eight
hundred years of energy at its current rate of use.4 On the other
hand, independent of the development of nuclear fusion (combination of nuclei as differing from the splitting of nuclei or
1. Toward on Energy Policy: Recent Studies Offer Guidancein Assessing the Administration ' Forthcoming Proposals, 5 E. R. - CURR. DEv. 10003 (1975) (hereinafter
cited as Toward an Energy Policy); 14 NAT. R s. J. 411 (1975); Lieberman, Generic
Hearings: Preparationfor the Future, 16 AT. EN. L. J. 141 (1974).
2. Kennedy, Mutual Cooperation With State Governments, 17 AT. EN. L. J. 152,
155 (1975).
3. Tamplin, Reacting to Reactors, 10 TRIAL 15 (1974).
4. Toward an Energy Polic,, supra note 1.
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fission) generated electricity, and considering full implementation of the fast breeder reactor, the uranium and thorium
sources in the United States offer twenty thousand years of
energy through nuclear fission. 5 Nuclear fusion presents an
even more abundant source of energy because it utilizes as fuel
an isotope of hydrogen which may be obtained from the
oceans.'
Nuclear generation of electricity, however, while seemingly
offering the final answer to the energy crisis, requires that society accept both the risks of nuclear disaster and the care of
lethal radioactive wastes. The operation of a nuclear power
reactor producs vast amounts of such radioactive materials as
plutonium, one of the most toxic substances known to man,
presenting both somatic and genetic hazards.7
It has been estimated that assuming the worst possible
combination of factors, a reactor accident could result in the
deaths of up to 45,000 persons and contamination of over
150,000 square miles of land.8 The risk of a catastrophic accident has been estimated at approximately one in 17,000 per
reactor per year,' but considering projections of a potential
1,000 reactors by the year 2000, this estimate provides little
solace. While nuclear energy proponents boast an unparalleled
safety record,' 0 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission reported
1400 abnormal events in 1974, four of which had a direct and
significant bearing on nuclear safety and control."
Thus, the benefits to be obtained from nuclear power are
5. Plumlee, Perspectives in U.S. Energy Resource Development, 3 ENV. AFF. 1, 9
(1974).
6. S. GIASSTONE & R. LOVBERG, CONTROLLED THERMONUCLEAR REACTIONS 2 (1960).
7. Gofman & Tamplin, Nuclear Power, Technology and Environmental Law, 2
ENV. LAW 57 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Nuclear Power).
8. Jacks, The Public and the Peaceful Atom: Participationin AEC Regulatory
Proceedings, 52 TEX. L. REV. 466, 470, n. 7 (1914) (hereinafter cited as PeacefulAtom);
Nuclear Power, supra note 7, at 66.
9. AEC, Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, 16 AT. EN. L. J. 177 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Reactor
Safety Study). This is a summary of the controversial preliminary study performed
under the direction of Dr. Norman C. Rasmussen of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. These conclusions were confirmed in the final report of this three year
study released on October 30, 1975. NRC Reports Little Probabilityof Nuclear Accidents CausingDeaths, 6 E. R.-CURR. DEV. 1242 (1974).
10. Doub, Nuclear Power: A Cool Approach, 10 TRIAL 18 (1974).
11. Chicago Sun-Times, Feb. 14, 1975 at 18, col. 1, cited in Porter County Chapter
of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission, 515 F.2d
513 (7th Cir. 1975).
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counterbalanced by grave environmental consequences, and in
order to take advantage of this energy source it is necessary
that its hazards be vigorously regulated in the public interest.
II. BASIC REGULATORY SCHEME
A. The Atomic Energy Act and the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974
The Atomic Energy Act of 195412 (hereinafter referred to as
the 1954 Act) constitutes the major statutory regulation of the
utilization of atomic power and, thus, also radioactive pollution. The 1954 Act gave the Atomic Energy Commission (hereinafter referred to as the AEC) authority over essentially all
activities concerning radioactive materials and facilities for
their production or use.' 3 The AEC was entrusted with not only
the management of the military uses of atomic energy, but also
the development of its peaceful applications and the regulation
of radiation to assure public health and safety.' 4 The combination of the responsibilities of promotion and development of the
commercial uses of atomic energy with the regulatory function
has proved to be one of the greatest governmental conflicts of
interest.'5 Only recently, under the Energy Reorganization Act
of 197416 (hereinafter referred to as the Reorganization Act),
have these functions been separated.
The Reorganization Act, which became effective in February of 1975, created two separate and independent agencies to
carry out the responsibilities of the AEC, which was abolished.'7 The Energy Research and Development Administration was established and given all the functions of the AEC, 8
excepting those of regulation and licensing, which were transferred to the new Nuclear Regulatory Commission 9 (hereinafter referred to as the NRC). Thus, it is the activities and
functions of the NRC which are most relevant to this discussion.
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970).
13. FEDERAl. ENVIRONMENTAL. LAW 1026-27 (1974).
14. Moore, The Environmentalist and Radioactive Waste, 49 CHI.-KENTL. REv. 55,
62 (1972) (hereinafter cited as Moore).
15. .Jacks & Raft, The Bureaucracyof Power, 10 TRIAL 28 (1974).
16. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5801 (1975).
17. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5814(a) (1975).
18. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5811 (1975).
19. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5841 (1975).
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Basically, the powers of the NRC are composed of complete
jurisdiction over the handling of special nuclear materials 20
(those materials most readily fissionable to produce energy 2
plutonium, uranium-233, uranium-235), source materials '
(those materials essential to the production of special nuclear
material), and by-product materials 22 (any material yielded in
the use of special nuclear material). No one may deal with
these materials without a license from the NRC. The 1954 Act
also requires that all facilities which either produce or use spe2
cial nuclear material be licensed by the NRC. 1
In regard to radioactive pollution and its environmental
threat, the 1954 Act provides that the regulation of nuclear
energy must provide "adequate protection to the health and
safety of the public. ' 24 Thus, the standards of protection of the
public and the environment from nuclear hazards are placed
within the administrative discretion of the NRC. An extensive
code of regulations promulgated by the AEC are contained in
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. These regulations
specify, among other things, standards for protection against
radiation 25 and general design criteria for nuclear power
plants. 26 The regulations also recognize a duty on the part of
the NRC and those handling nuclear materials to protect the
public and the environment. Thus, it is provided that an activity such as the licensing of a power plant will be permitted only
if the NRC finds "a reasonable assurance that the health and
safety of the public will not be endangered."2 7 Under the statutes, a violation of the licensing requirements may result in a
fine of up to $10,000 and/or ten years in prison. 2 The regula2
tions provide for injunctive relief if they are violated. 1
B. The National Environmental Policy Act
Because it has affected every aspect of environmental law,
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

42
42
42
42
42
10
10
10
42
10

U.S.C. §§ 2071-78 (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 2014(aa) (1970).
U.S.C. § 2014(z) (1970); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2091-99 (1970).
U.S.C. § 2014(e) (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 2111-12 (1970).
U.S.C. § 2131 (1970).
U.S.C. § 2232(a) (1970).
C.F.R. Part 20 (1975).
C.F.R. Part 50, App. A (1975).
C.F.R. § 50.40(a) (1975).
U.S.C. § 2272 (1970).
C.F.R. § 20.601, § 50.110 (1975).
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the National Environmental Policy Act ° (hereinafter referred
to as NEPA) has had a profound impact upon the regulatory
responsibilities of the NRC. Chief among its provisions is the
requirement that all federal agencies must include in every
recommendation relating to major federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment a detailed discussion, termed an environmental impact statement, of basic
short-term and long-term environmental consequences of the
proposed action, as well as any alternative courses of action.3 '
Equally important is NEPA's requirement that each federal
agency utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach to insure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences in any
decision making which may have an impact on the environ32
ment.
The landmark case of Calvert Cliffs' CoordinatingCommittee, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission33 interpreted NEPA to
impose an expansion of the regulatory duties of the AEC. Prior
to this decision, the AEC had been able to avoid consideration
of all non-radiological environmental effects, such as thermal
pollution, at its hearings for reactor licensing.34 The AEC procedural rules prior to Calvert Cliffs'not only limited environmental considerations to radiological pollution, but also provided
that the AEC would only consider at a licensing hearing those
matters which were raised by intervenors to the process and
which had not been the subject of consideration of another
agency. As one may imagine, this procedure virtually excluded
all but limited consideration of the radiological effect of the
plant's operation. The First Circuit Court in Calvert Cliffs',
however, interpreted NEPA to require detailed consideration of
all environmental matters.
C. Public Participationin Nuclear Power Regulation
The 1954 Act requires that the NRC grant a hearing to any
"person whose interest may be affected" by the "granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of any license of construction
permit."3" Under current practice, the NRC, before issuing a
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-49 (1970).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).

32.
33.
34.
1969),
35.

42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A) (1970).
449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
See New Hampshire v. Atomic Energy Commission, 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir.
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1969).
42 U.S.C. § 22 3 9(a) (1970).
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construction permit or operation license, issues a notice of receipt of the application and allows public participation in a
hearing. There exist two major problems, however, in the area
of public participation. First, the public is effectively excluded
from the critical site selection process. This is basically because
there are no requirements for public intervention in this process, and power companies planning to build nuclear plants
generally proceed in the utmost secrecy when selecting land to
prevent increases in the selling price and lessen adverse public
reaction. Secondly, by the time of the initial public participation, extensive deliberations between the NRC and the applicant for a permit have taken place regarding most, if not all,
of the substantive details of the proposed plant. By this time,
therefore, the NRC has invested significant resources in coming
to agreement with the applicant on most of these matters.
Because these important agreements have been reached out
of the public view and usually without a significant public
input, except for possible comment on the draft environmental impact statement, it is not unnatural that public intervenors regard the issuance of a license as a fait accompli and
their participation as a meaningless sop granted for cosmetic
purposes."
Until recently, there has also been limited public involvement in the setting of exposure and design standard in the
NRC regulations. In order to implement a recently announced
standardization policy,"l the NRC has recognized the desirability of a generic approach to the licensing of nuclear power
plants. This approach involves the identification and separate
treatment, in a single proceeding, of issues common to all
plants. Thus far, four such generic type hearings have been
completed concerning the standards for the design of emergency core cooling systems, power plant effluents, the uranium
fuel cycle, and the transportation of fuel and wastes."
The generic hearing approach may be criticized for limiting
the opportunities for public involvement and also for excluding
.36. Whitney, Enhancing Public Acceptance of Nuclear Decisionmaking,15 Wm. &
MARY L. REv. 557, 564 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Whitney).

37. Commission Policy Statement on Standardization of Nuclear Power Plants
(April 28, 1972).
38. Trosten & Moore, NuclearPower PlantStandardization:Promisesand Pitfalls,
15 WN1. & MARY L. REv. 527, n. 3 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Trosten & Moore).
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local intervenors from contesting matters which were decided
at a generic hearing. On the other hand, this procedure, in
conjunction with a standardization program, fosters greater
safety in the construction and operation of plants. Two basic
reasons for this are that both the promoting group and the
public interest group would be permitted to concentrate technical and financial resources in a single consolidated proceeding affecting nuclear power use in general, and there will be a
great advantage in the experience gained in the construction,
39
start-up, and operation of a particular standardized design.
III.

REGULATION IN RESPECT TO PARTICULAR ENVIRONMENTAL

RISKS

Due to the complicated nature of the engineering of atomic
power and the magnitude of the environmental hazards it presents, the subject matter for a broad treatment of the regulation
of nuclear energy is too vast. Therefore, to facilitate discussion
of the legal and environmental issues involved, it is worthwhile
to examine regulation in the context of its approach to particular hazards of the utilization of nuclear energy.
A. Radioactive Pollution
One subject which has been the source of great controversy
is the setting of standards which govern public exposure to
radiation. These standards are contained in Part 20 of the AEC
regulations"0 which have been transferred to the NRC under the
Reorganization Act, and apply to activities requiring a license
under the 1954 Act. The President's Reorganization Plan No.
3 of 19701 transferred to the Environmental Protection Agency
(hereinafter referred to as the EPA) the authority to set standards for public exposure, but the EPA has not yet modified
42
the preexisting Part 20 standards.
The primary standard is that no person outside the perimeter of a nuclear facility shall receive more than 0.5 rem per
year. 3 In addition, the Federal Radiation Council has recom39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.at 531-32.
10 C.F.R. Part 20 (1975).
42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
FDERAi. ENVIRONMENTAl. LAW 1027 (1974).

10 C.F.R. § 20.105(a) (1975). A "rem" is a unit of radiation dosage related to

hiological effects, roentgen equivalent man. The average chest X-ray delivers a dose
of 0.2 rem.
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mended that the average exposure of the United States population should be kept below 0.17 rem per year." The adequacy
of these standards has been vigorously attacked on the ground
that there exist unrefuted findings of serious cancer and genetic
danger at those levels of exposure. 5 Arthur L. Tamplin and
John W. Gofman of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory published a paper in 1970 which concluded that if everyone in the
United States were to receive 0.17 rem per year, an increase of
32,000 cancer cases would occur each year. 6
Of course, this area of regulation involves basic risk-benefit
determinations - a certain amount of risk is warranted in
order to obtain the benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear power. The fact is, however, that the standard itself is a
calculated risk. Scientific knowledge of the effects of radiation
exposure, particularly in low doses, is only twenty-five years
old and very limited, and is consequently insufficient to determine the precise risk of danger. 7
Considering the state of the knowledge, therefore, it is disturbing that while nuclear proponents argue that presently no
one in the United States is exposed to even a small fraction of
the permissible amounts, the standards have not been reduced
and licensees have merely been admonished to "make every
reasonable effort to maintain radiation exposure, and releases
of radioactive materials in effluents. . . as far below the limits
. . . as practicable." 4 It is also unfortunate that the riskbenefit judgments are' being made by scientific experts based
upon incomplete knowledge with virtually no public input
whatsoever as to what benefits the public desires or what risk
it is willing to accept.
Challenges through the judicial system to the Part 20 standards alleging that the standards are not reasonably adequate
to protect the public health and safety as required under the
1954 Act have proven unsuccessful.49 The refusal to alter the
standards has been based upon judicial deference to the discre44. Nuclear Pou'er, supra note 7, at 60.
45. Id.at 61.
46. Gofman & Tamplin, A Proposalfor a Five Year Moratorium on Above Ground
Nuclear Power Plants (1970), cited in PeacefulAtom, supra note 8,at 474, n. 27.
47. Green, Radioactive Wastes and the Environment, 11 NAT. REs. J. 281, 292
(1971).
48. 10 C.F.R. § 20.1 (1975).
49. See Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D.Colo. 1970).
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tion and expertise of the administrative agency in setting the
standards.-" It has been suggested that under the requirements
of NEPA to evaluate all environmental factors, challenges to
Part 20 standards may be considered during the licensing process.5 ' Deference to the discretion of the agency which is the
major proponent of the project virtually denies the public protection from nuclear hazards. Perhaps the division of the development and regulatory functions of the old AEC will provide
more protection. In addition, it would appear that the generic
hearing approach could serve to present before the public in a
controlled setting bona fide scientific challenges to the present
standards. Where the evidence is in such conflicting confusion,
as it is in this area, it would be better for those who are to bear
the risk, the public, to have the opportunity to be represented
on the matter.
At the present time there is considerable dispute over the
regulation of radioactive pollution of water. In the case of
Colorado Public Interest Research Group v. Train 2 the question has been raised whether under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (hereinafter referred to
as the 1972 Amendments) the Administrator of EPA has been
charged with the nondiscretionary duty to control discharges of
radioactive materials into navigable waters. Under the 1972
Amendments it is unlawful to discharge any pollutant into
navigable waters without a permit issued by the Administrator. 3 Before a permit may be issued, the Administrator must
allow opportunity for public hearing. 4
The conflict between the 1972 Amendments and the 1954
Act arises from the definition of "pollutant" under the 1972
Amendments. 5 That definition includes "radioactive materials." In regulations promulgated on July 1, 1973, the Administrator of the EPA, Russell Train, limited the application of the
1972 Amendments to only those "radioactive materials which
are not encompassed in the definition of source, by-product, or
special nuclear materials as defined by the Atomic Energy Act
50. Id. at 1231.
51. Taming the Technological Tyger, 1 FORD. URB. L. J. 149, 162 (1972) (hereinafter
cited as Technological Tyger).
52. 507 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 998 (1975).
53. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (Supp. 1973).
54. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (Supp. 1973).
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (Supp. 1973).
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of 1954."56 It is the goal of the plaintiffs in the Train case to
compel the Administrator to control all radioactive discharges
into navigable waters.
The Tenth Circuit, reversing the Colorado District Court,
and applying basic rules of statutory construction, held that to
exclude "source, by-product, and special materials" from the
1972 Amendments would "devour the general policy of the statute.",' , This decision to compel the Administrator to regulate
such discharges, if affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court, will work to the advantage of nuclear opponents in two
ways. First, it provides another review of the level of radioactive pollution produced by a particular plant. Second, the required administrative review constitutes another obstacle and
delay in the path of construction of a nuclear plant.
B. Thermal Pollution
Under NEPA and the Calvert Cliffs' case,58 the NRC is
required to consider thermal effects in its risk-benefit analysis
of license applications. A nuclear plant requires the utilization
of large quantities of water for cooling purposes, which is cycled
through the plant and returned to its original source, generally
a stream or river. This type of pollution can have a disastrous
effect on the ecosystem of the water source: Nevertheless, this
topic is merely one which must be considered by the NRC in
its licensing procedures.
In addition, under the 1972 Amendments, "heat" is included in the definition of "pollutant," and therefore, thermal
pollution is subject to the regulatory powers of the Administrator of the EPA.59 The EPA has recently suggested imposing a
requirement that all nuclear power plants employ "closed
cycle" cooling systems, which would totally eliminate a thermal effect."0
C. Loss of Coolant Accident
In the event that the cooling system of a nuclear power
reactor would malfunction so as to cause a loss of coolant acci56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

40 C.F.R. § 125.1(x) (1973).
507 F.2d at 749.
449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (Supp. 1973).
Peaceful Atom, supra note 8,at 478.
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dent (hereinafter referred to as a LOCA), it is possible for the
reactor core to overheat, and even though the chain fission
reaction would be stopped by the control rods within the fuel
core, thereby averting nuclear explosion, the fuel and byproducts would generate enough decay heat to melt down the
fuel core as well as its containment structure.' This heat would
also be capable of causing a steam explosion within the inactive
reactor cooling system. Such an accident, of course, would release large amounts of radioactive material.
In order to prevent this occurrence the NRC requires that
reactors be equipped with an emergency core cooling system
(hereinafter referred to as an ECCS). The adequacy of the
design criteria for the ECCS, like the radiation exposure standards discussed earlier, has been challenged as being below the
capabilities of modern engineering science. 2 Due to a lack of
large-scale test information, the debate over the ECCS reduces
to the weighing of the benefits versus the risks in the absence
of knowledge as to what the risk is, as well as to whether the
design criteria embodies an adequate protection.
On the one hand, nuclear proponents argue that the likelihood of a core melt accident (which includes failure of the
ECCS) is much smaller than many non-nuclear accidents,
such as fires, earthquakes, or airplane crashes, which have similar consequences. 3 It is claimed that the likelihood of a core
melt is one in 17,000 per reactor per year and that only one in
ten core melts will result in measurable health effects. 4 Critics
of the NRC contend that the release of even a small fraction of
radioactive material will have lethal results, and they point to
the projections of one thousand plants by the year 2000 as
increasing the likelihood of a core melt to a virtual certainty.
Statistically it is noteworthy that the individual chance of fatality in an automobile accident per year is one in four thousand, while it has been estimated that the chance of fatality
due to a nuclear reactor accident with one hundred plants in
operation is only one in three hundred million.6
61.
62,
63.
64.
65.
66.

Reactor Safety Study, supra note 9.
Ford & Kendall, What Price Nuclear Power?, 10 TRIAL 11 (1974).
Reactor Safety Study, supra note 9, at 178.
Id. at 191.
Ford & Kendall, What Price Nuclear Power?, 10 TRIAL 11 (1974).
Reactor Safety Study. supra note 9, at 182.
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On June 29, 1971 the AEC announced the adoption of the
ECCS Interim Acceptance Criteria. 7 The AEC then held a
two-year-long rulemaking proceeding to determine whether the
Interim Criteria should be adopted permanently." At this proceeding critics argued for a moratorium on the construction
and operation of nuclear plants pending the determination of
the ECCS's reliability." Actions were also commenced in federal court based upon the theory that it had not been established that the ECCS's (which had been based upon the Interim Acceptance Criteria) of particular plants satisfied the
test of reasonable assurance of adequate protection to the
health and safety of the public, and that therefore the plants
should not be allowed to operate." In those cases, Nader v.
NuclearRegulatory Commission" and Unionof ConcernedSci2 the District of Columentists v. Atomic Energy Commission,"
bia District Court resolved this question in favor of the Commission, essentially deferring to the expertise and discretion of
the agency.
Stringent technological regulation does not necessarily
guarantee safety. In January of 1975, upon the discovery of
cracks in the ECCS of a reactor near Joliet, Illinois, the NRC
ordered a shut-down of more than one-half of the operating
reactors.7 3 In addition, technological failure does not present
the only danger. This was clearly illustrated by the near catastrophic occurrence on March 22, 1975, at the Brown's Ferry
nuclear plant, the world's largest reactor complex. An accidental fire disabled the plant's electrical and safety systems. While
a meltdown was narrowly averted, the fact that the fire was
started by a careless technician using a candle for lighting is
disturbing.
The Brown's Ferry accident was a factor in the recent dramatic resignations of three managing engineers of the nuclear
energy division of General Electric Company. The three
67. 36 F.R. 12247 (1971).
68. 36 F.R. 22774 (1971).
69. Peaceful Atom, supra note 8, at 469.
70. Nader v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 513 F.2d 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Union of Concerned Scientists v. Atomic Energy Commission, 499 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
71. 513 F.2d 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
72. 499 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
73. Evans, Sierra Club Involvement in Nuclear Power:An Evolution of Awareness,
54 ORF. L. REv. 607, 614, n. 46 (1975) (hereinafter cited as Evans).
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middle-management engineers, Gregory Minor, Richard Hubbard, and Dale Bridenbaugh, resigned on February 2, 1976,
citing concerns about the human factor in reactor safety and
the proliferation of nuclear technology in other nations as
among their reasons for leaving the industry to join the nuclear
opponents. 7 No less significant was the resignation on February 13, 1976, of Robert D. Pollard, a project manager for the
NRC. Pollard protested poorly designed reactor safeguards and
the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the NRC to receive views
75
which are opposed to its own policy.
In regard to the type of accident the ECCS guards against,
it is relevant to examine the Price-Anderson Act, 7 which would
appear to be theoretically opposed to the proposition that there
exists reasonable assurance of safety in nuclear power plants.
This Act has been recently extended through 1987.17 The PriceAnderson Act gives financial protection to licensees of nuclear
power plants by providing for government indemnification
against loss in the event of a major nuclear accident and also
requires the licensee to waive certain defenses to liability in the
event of such an occurrence. 78 The indemnification under this
law has been critically important to the proliferation of nuclear
power plants, in that the private insurance industry has refused to insure nuclear reactors to any significant extent. The
Price-Anderson Act, however, places a maximum of 560 million
dollars on the liability for a single accident, 7 when it has been
estimated that such liability could be from six billion to seventeen billion dollars."
The avowed purpose of the Price-Anderson Act is to provide
financial protection for the public and to assure the nuclear
power industry that it would not be wiped out by the virtually
unlimited liability which would result from a major nuclear
occurrence.8 Nevertheless, the fundamental reason for the Act
is that the private insurance industry will not provide the necessary amounts of insurance because it lacks the actuarial ex74. 122 CoNG. REC. S1081 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1976); 122 CoNG. REc. H960 (daily ed.
Feb. 11, 1976); Time, Feb. 16, 1976, at 78.
75. 122 CoN. REC. S1082 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1976); Time, Feb. 23, 1976, at 45.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1970).
77. Act of Dec. 31, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-197, 89 Stat. 1111.
78. 6 RLrr.-CANI. L. REV. 360 (1974).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1970).
80. 122 CON. REC. S1081 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1976).
81. 121 CONG;. REc. S22599 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1975).
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perience on which to base a judgment as to the likelihood of
such an accident.82 The question may be asked, therefore, in
that it has been projected that one hundred nuclear reactors
would have an accident involving one thousand or more deaths
only once in a million years, how long will it be before the
actuarial experience is obtained? If such an accident must first
occur, liability coverage will be too late. Despite the arguments
of Price-Anderson proponents, the underlying implication of
this piece of legislation could not be made more clear than by
this passage:
Nuclear power proponents have stated that the private
insurance industry lacks the actuarial experience and that
this accounts for its reluctance to insure nuclear power plants
for a significant portion of the potential liability. Precisely
correct! What is not stated by the nuclear power proponents
is that the U.S. public also lacks the actuarial experience
with respect to loss of life from nuclear power plant accidents.
But the public is not granted the same option as the insurance companies - the public is forced to take the risk of life
itself.
It is a strange spectacle indeed for the AEC to be licensing
nuclear power plants that are uninsurable. If the plants were
safe, they should be insurable. If they are uninsurable, it
defeats understanding how they may be considered worthy of
licensing."
D. Earthquakes and Sabotage
It is apparent that an earthquake could seriously damage a
reactor causing the release of large amounts of radioactivity.
This danger is complicated by the imprecision in the science
of seismology coupled with the secrecy employed in the siting
decision.84 Despite this threat, consideration of the potentiality
of an earthquake at the reactor site is only regulated by the
"reasonable assurance" language of the statute, and thus is
determined on a case-by-case basis.
In this regard, it is worthwhile to note another example of
the fact that even the most stringent technological regulation
does not guarantee safety. Recently, the NRC fined the Virginia Electric and Power Company $60,000 for making false
82. H.R. REP. No. 883, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1975).
83. Nuclear Power, supra note 7, at 69.
84. Peaceful Atom. supra note 8, at 472.
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statements when it denied knowledge of a geologic fault at the
site of its reactor near Charlottesville, Virginia. 85
With the dramatic increase in terrorist activities, it is important to consider the threat of sabotage or theft of radioactive
material for building home-made atomic weapons. While sabotage has been held not to be a matter which requires the NRC's
attention in a licensing proceeding or requires a special design
for protection, 8 the NRC has taken affirmative action by adopting regulations requiring protective measures against domestic sabotage. The threat of nuclear theft has been discounted,
however, on the basis of the immense difficulty in first obtaining the nuclear fuel and finally constructing a weapon. It has
been suggested that a major paramilitary effort would be required to merely obtain the fuel, perhaps involving up to fifteen
men who are willing to die. The construction of the bomb could
take several months, and over that period of time the terrorists
would be subjecting themselves to a very grave danger of death
through radiation exposure. 7
E. Disposal of Radioactive Wastes
The disposal of radioactive wastes produced by uranium
mining and power plant operations is subject to the same standards for radiation exposure as apply to power plant operations. This disposal is, of course, subject to the provisions of
NEPA and the hearing requirements of the 1954 Act. The
major problem of this aspect of nuclear power generation is the
long-lived radioactivity of nuclear waste combined with a lack
of knowledge, both scientific and economic, of methods for disposal.
There are two classifications of radioactive waste. Low level
wastes are those of low activity, which, it is believed, may be
released to the environment. High level wastes, generally produced during the reprocessing of spent fuel, are dangerously
radioactive and must be stored perpetually to prevent escape
to the environment. 8 In order to appreciate the continual danger of high level wastes, one need only consider that the esti85. Virginia Power Company Fined $60,000 For Making False Statements to NRC,
6 E. R. - CURR. DEv. 876 (1975).
86. Siegel v. Atomic Energy Commission, 400 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
87. Milwaukee Journal, Nov. 30, 1975, part 5, at 1, col. 1.
88. 10 C.F.R. § 50.34 (1975).
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mates of the time which plutonium, a waste product of nuclear
power plant operation and one of the most toxic substances
known to man, must be excluded from the environment range
from 240,000 to 500,000 years, 89 while man has existed for only
about 100,000 years.99
The store of radioactive waste is constantly growing. Presently there exist two billion cubic feet of waste from uranium
mining operations, and it is predicted that by the turn of the
century the accumulation of these wastes will approach twenty
billion cubic feet.9" At the end of 1969 there were more than
eight million gallons of power plant waste stored underground,9" and it has been estimated that by the year 2000, the
volume of these wastes will reach 200 million cubic feet of high
level classification,93 while fifteen thousand tons will be produced each year.94
No real strategy has yet been developed for the control of
radioactive wastes, and the present storage systems are of an
interim nature.9 5 The most prevalent method of storage is in
underground tanks imbedded in concrete at NRC facilities.
While taking thousands of years to decay, these materials are
constantly boiling and so corrosive that they must be transferred to new tanks about every ten years.98 It is planned to
store these wastes permanently in salt mines, where the geology
is particularly stable, but perhaps the best proposal suggested
is to shoot the wastes into the sun,97 if the risk of such a space
launch could be tolerated. While stored on earth these materials are susceptible to natural catastrophe, war, or human mistake.
IV.

STATE REGULATION

In the case of NorthernStates Power Co. v. Minnesota," the
AEC had issued a construction permit to the plaintiff Northern
89. Evans, supra note 73, at 616; Milwaukee Journal, April 11, 1976, Accent sec.,
at 1, col. 1.
90. R. LAZARUS, POPULATION 9 (1969).
91. Milwaukee Journal, supra note 89.
92. Moore, supra note 14.
93. Strelow Calls For Development of Permanent Waste Disposal Method, 6 E. R.
- CtRw. DEV. 1368 (1975) (hereinafter cited as Strelow).
94. Green, Radioactive Waste and the Environment, 11 NAT. REs. J. 281, 284
(1971).
95. Milwaukee Journal, supra note 89; Strelow, supra note 93; Evans, supra note
73, at 616.
96. 10 NEW ENG. L. RFv. 305 (1974).
97. Moore, supra note 14, at 61.
98. 320 F. Supp. 172 (D. Minn. 1970).
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States to construct a nuclear power plant. After construction,
the Pollution Control Agency of Minnesota issued a permit to
Northern States to operate by attached conditions regulating
the radioactive content of the waste discharge which were more
stringent than the federal standards. The plaintiff could not
meet the state standards, and thus commenced suit alleging
that Minnesota was without authority to regulate the discharge
of radioactive waste because the field had been preempted by
the federal government. The district court found that it was the
intent of Congress to preempt the field, and thus, the federal
government has the exclusive authority to regulate radioactive
emissions from nuclear power facilities.
Such preemption does not extend beyond radiological pollution. For example, in State of New Jersey, Department of
Environmental Protection v. Jersey Central Power & Light
Company" the defendant power company was fined six thousand dollars under state law for the damage it caused to the
ecosystem when its nuclear power plant shut down, thereby
discharging cooler waters into a nearby creek and producing a
thirteen degree drop in temperature. This caused the death of
one half million fish.
In the recent case of Marshall v. Consumers Power
Company'0 0 this radiological/nonradiological dichotomy has
been further clarified. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's proposed nuclear power plant constituted a private and
public nuisance for both radiological and nonradiological reasons. The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the federal law
preempted any consideration by a state court of the radiological hazards presented by the workability of the emergency core
cooling system or the possibility of a nuclear accident. The
court further held, however, that it could consider the claims
arising from nonradiological hazards, such as fogging caused by
the plant's cooling towers. The court stated:
[Congress] also was careful not to impinge on state authority over nonradiological problems resulting from nuclear
plant operation. Commentators have placed in this category
such matters as site selection and zoning, local pollution,
building and equipment codes on nonradiation machinery
and working conditions of plant employees. All such concerns
99. 133 N.J. Super. 375, 336 A.2d 750 (1975).
100. 65 Mich. App. 237, 237 N.W.2d 266 (1975).
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are intricately related to the construction and operation of
nuclear plants, but all have historically been left to state
regulation. (footnotes omitted).'"
While in the Marshall case it was found that the plaintiff's
claims of nonradiological hazards were not actionable, the
court did state that it had the power to enjoin, at least temporarily, the construction of the plant if it found a nuisance to
exist.10 2 The most significant aspect of the Marshall opinion,
however, is its statement that a state, for whatever hazards,
radiological or nonradiological, could not declare a nuclear
power plant a nuisance per se. 0 The court remarked:
Specifically, if it [were] found that a nuisance did exist, a
court could, if there were no remedy at law, exercise its equitable powers and require defendant to establish measures to
abate the nuisance, given current technology. If such measures made the construction impossible, they could not be
required. In such a case, the Federal interest would prevent
state action from absolutely prohibiting construction of nuclear power plants within its boundaries. Short of such a
situation, state required abatement procedures would be le04
gitimate.1
At this time, twenty-one states are actively considering legislative proposals which would limit the proliferation of nuclear
power plants in their states.' 5 These proposals typically provide for a moratorium on further construction while a special
state commission conducts studies in order to make a safety
determination in regard to nuclear technology. As the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded in the Marshall case, there can
be no doubt that any state measure which would forbid the
construction of nuclear power plants in a state is unconstitutional, in that such a measure would impinge on federal regulation of radioactive hazards. Thus, a state's passage of a nuclear
moratorium bill would be valueless, except as an expression of
opinion. It would be wiser for nuclear opponents to concentrate
their finances and energies on the passage of a federal morato0
rium.' '
101. Id. at 251, 237 N.W.2d at 276-77.
102. Id. at 263, 237 N.W.2d at 282.
103. Id. at 262, 237 N.W.2d at 281-82.
104. Id. at 263-64, 237 N.W.2d at 282.
105. 122 CoNG. RF.c. S325 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1976).
106. See H.R. 11880, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). This is a bill to terminate the
granting of construction licenses of nuclear fission plants pending study by Congress

of nuclear fuel cycles with particular reference to safety and environmental hazards.
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PROBLEM ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION

It is clear that a major factor in the problem of nuclear
power is its immediacy. The energy crisis requires that action
be taken now in terms of decisions as to where our energy comes
from. The dilemma which is therefore presented arises from the
fact that all is not clear as to the dangers involved in the use
of nuclear power. It is important to realize the potential for
time lag effects in the impact of nuclear power upon society.
One only need consider the length of time which elapsed before
we recognized the injurious characteristics of automobile exhaust or DDT to appreciate the need for proceeding cautiously.
Add to this the fact that today there are fifty-six plants in
operation and sixty-three in the process of construction along
with the projections of a reliance upon nuclear energy for fifty
percent of this nation's electrical needs by the year 2000, and
one can see the terrible impact upon the nation if at the turn
of the century it is discovered that the risks of nuclear energy
are as great as some experts suggest.
Thus, in order to promote the wise implementation of this
energy source it is imperative that nuclear energy be vigorously
regulated to insure the utmost in safety. Strong steps in this
direction will be made through the adoption of a standardization policy employing the generic hearing procedure. Although
it is argued that generic consideration of vital issues will exclude the ordinary person from his opportunity to be heard, it
should be realized that a standardized approach will foster
greater safety in the construction of plants.
Steps must be taken to attempt to solve some of the scientific disputes over nuclear power which have recently been
brought to light by resignations of industry engineers. While
there is no more reason to expect total agreement on technical
issues than on the social issues, it is probably more imporrant
that, if plants are to be built, consensus be reached as to the
safest methods. The intriguing proposal of physicist Arthur
Kantrowitz to create a panel which would hear arguments and
render a decision as to factual issues in scientific public policy
disputes0 7 might practically serve to rectify some of the public
confusion.
Another measure that would greatly enhance the credibility
of the commercial development of nuclear power would be a
107. Time, Feb. 23, 1976, at 45.
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major program to inform the public of all aspects of the use of
nuclear power.108 Because of the present procedures for public
participation, generally the public is only involved in the adjudications in respect to a particular plant, and the public rarely
takes part in the more basic questions surrounding the use of
atomic power. Because of the conflicting view and lack of scientific knowledge, it is important that the public be given the
opportunity to voice its opinion concerning the risks involved
and also to take part in the fundamental decisions.
Also, in conjunction with a more conservative approach to
the proliferation of nuclear power plants it is essential that the
ultimate effort be made to conserve present energy sources to
"buy" time for advancement in nuclear safety.
Therefore, the implementation of standardization policy, a
greater awareness and participation by the public, and a concerted effort to conserve energy would serve to insure safety at
a level at which the public is willing to take the risk.
MARK S. YOUNG

108. Whitney, supra note 36, at 563.

